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Abstract. This paper maps out the factors regarding the Charter’s scope of application and then provides an 
overview of the subsequent interpretation afforded by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The 
content and repercussions of the CJEU’s interpretation of the field of application of the Charter in the Member 
States will also be discussed and, finally, the focus will be turned to how the Hungarian judiciary refers and applies 
the Charter. The analysis of the practice of the national courts will show that despite the CJEU’s guidelines on 
situations when recourse to the Charter is required, Hungarian courts have applied a narrow reading of the Charter 
and have thereby insulated significant national measures that give effect to EU law from EU fundamental rights 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is the primary written EU instrument for the 
protection of fundamental rights in situations falling within the ambit of EU law. However, 
since the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) was proclaimed on 7 December 
2000,1 and its subsequent recognition of having equal value to the founding treaties by the 
Treaty of Lisbon,2 the precise scope of its application has been an issue of debate and, in 
some cases, concern. The Charter’s applicability, especially in domestic context by the 
national courts, has been the source of uncertainty, despite the horizontal provisions found 
at the end of the Charter governing its scope and relation to national law and to that of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
This paper maps out the factors regarding the Charter’s scope of application and then 
provides an overview of the subsequent interpretation afforded by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). The content and repercussions of the CJEU’s interpretation of 
the field of application of the Charter in the Member States will also be discussed and, 
finally, the focus will be turned to how the Hungarian judiciary refers and applies the 
Charter. The analysis of the practice of the national courts will show that despite the CJEU’s 
guidelines on situations when recourse to the Charter is required, Hungarian courts have 
applied a narrow reading of the Charter and have thereby insulated significant national 
measures that give effect to EU law from EU fundamental rights scrutiny.
2. DEFINING THE FIELD OF APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER  
WITH PRIOR CJEU CASE LAW
Delimiting the applicability of the Charter is key for deciding its effects in situations when 
national law touches upon areas governed by EU law. Restricting the Charter to apply only 
to cases involving EU institutions, and making it marginally applicable in the context of 
      *   Author’s affiliation. E-mail: jeney@ajk.elte.hu
1 OJ C 364/01 18.12.2000.
2 Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
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national law that also serves as a vehicle of EU law, would eventually make the Charter an 
obsolete instrument. However, expanding the scope of the Charter by allowing it to apply to 
a broad range of EU law governed national situations, primarily related to the actions of the 
EU Member States, would lead to a much more vigorous EU fundamental rights scrutiny. 
Thus, the key issue in drawing the scope of the applicability of the Charter is how far the 
fundamental rights review of Member States’ conduct will be taken if and when they 
operate under the auspices of EU law and much less about the issue of subjecting EU 
institutions to Charter review.
Among the final, horizontal clauses contained in Title VII of the Charter, Article 51 on 
the field of application stipulates that 
‘1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member 
States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, 
observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their 
respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in 
the Treaties. 
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks 
as defined in the Treaties.’
This provision is not very different in substance from the original 2000 version3 and 
contains further re-reassurances that the Charter shall not extend the scope of EU law or the 
competence of the EU. Concerns from the Member States regarding the ability of the 
Charter to extend the scope of EU law were and are closely linked to the scope of application 
of the Charter and how deeply the Charter is to penetrate into national law.
The first limb of paragraph 1 of Article 51 subjects the EU institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies to the Charter. This identification of the primary aim of the adopting Charter 
did not trigger any particular comment in academic literature, during or after the drafting 
process. However, the text, elevated to the primary law level by the Treaty of Lisbon, kept 
the most ambiguous phrase in the second limb of paragraph 1 of Article 51, making the 
Charter applicable to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’.4
This formulation immediately begs two questions: what is meant by ‘implementing 
Union law’ and whether there could be a situation when the scope of the Charter and the 
scope of EU law would differ. The underlying issue is whether the Member States are only 
subject to the Charter when they are strictly giving effect to EU law, e.g., when transposing 
an EU directive or does the Charter have a broader range of application to all Member State 
measures falling under the scope of EU law. The first scenario would entail that the Charter 
would not be applicable to the Member States when they act within the field of EU law, but 
do not strictly implement EU law. This leads to the more general issue of whether the scope 
3 For the version proclaimed in Nice see: “1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the 
institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, 
observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers. 
2. This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or modify 
powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.”
4 This matter is made more complex since the German language version uses the term 
‘Durchführung’ which translates as execution, whereas the French language version applies the term 
‘mettent en oeuvre’ that translates as implementation. 
61THE SCOPE OF THE EU CHARTER AND ITS APPLICATION BY THE HUNGARIAN COURTS
of the Charter is narrower than the scope of EU law where the applicability of the Charter is 
confined to the specific instances when Member States implement EU law. 
The accounts5 of the debates surrounding the inception of the original Charter, from 
the first Convention responsible for drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights6 and then 
subsequently on eve of the European Convention7 and then during the negotiations leading 
to the Treaty of Lisbon, all reveal that the drafters were very much aware of the gravity of 
the wording used. At the first Convention, the Presidium’s drafting proposal that would 
have put Member States under the scope of the Charter ‘when acting within the scope of 
Union law’, was flatly rejected as being potentially too broad in scope. Consensus could 
only be reached by making recourse to wording that was used by the CJEU in a judgment 
rendered at the time of the drafting, where the formula of ‘fundamental rights in the 
Community legal order are also binding on Member States when they implement 
Community rules ...’ was rigorously defined.8
Academic writing quickly highlighted that the use of this particular formulation for 
subjecting Member States to respect fundamental rights as protected under the Charter was 
in fact more restrictive than the then-current case law of the CJEU.9 The Court, by then, had 
a long standing doctrine according to which Member States must respect EU law based 
fundamental rights not only when EU provisions directly providing for the protection of 
human rights are applied10 but also when Member States act to implement and apply EU 
law. This was construed in a rather broad manner in the seminal Wachauf case,11 
which concerned the application of EU regulations on milk quotas by the Member State 
authorities as agents of EU law in the context of the shared administration of EU law. The 
Court found that in applying the said regulations, ‘those requirements [the protection of 
fundamental rights] are also binding on the Member States when they implement 
Community rules, [and therefore] the Member States must, as far as possible, apply those 
rules in accordance with those requirements’.12 It is clear from this wording that although 
the notion of implementation of Community law [EU law] is indeed used by the Court to 
oblige Member States to respect fundamental rights, it is done while referring to the 
application of EU law in general at the same time. Subsequent cases also support the 
observation that the Court has used the notion of implementing EU law, applying EU law 
and falling within the scope of EU law/Community law in an interchangeable fashion.13 
These cases show that the Court never wished to confine the notion of ‘the 
implementation of EU law’ to a narrow meaning, referring strictly to transposition or 
    5 Report by Clemens Ladenburger, The Institutional Report, at the FIDE 2012 Conference on 
the ‘Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon - The Interaction of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the European Convention and national Constitutions’ see section 3.1.
    6 The Cologne European Council (3-4 June 1999) entrusted the task of drafting the Charter to a 
Convention.
    7 European Convention on the Future of Europe convened by European Council which met in 
Laeken on 14 and 15 December 2001 which drew up the Treaty on the Constitution for Europe.
    8 C-292/97 Karlsson [2000] ECR I-2737.
    9 E.g. Pernice (2002) or more recently Peers, Hervey, Kenner, Ward (2014)1427–1449. 
10 118/75 Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, 222/84 Johnston [1986] ECR 1651. 
11 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609.
12 C-929/97 Karlsson [200] ECR I-2737. paragraph 37.
13 C-442/00 Caballero v Fondo de Garantia Salarial (Fogusa) [2002] ECR I-11915 paragraphs 
29–30.
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implementing an EU obligation to which a Member State is directly addressed. Given the 
diverse ways in which EU law is given effect in the national realm and that Member States, 
in principle, enjoy great freedom in choosing the means to that end, any restricted judicial 
interpretation of this notion probably would have proved highly unworkable in any case. 
Instead, the Court has construed this term to refer to any Member State action which gives 
effect to the enforcement of EU law and thus triggering the fundamental rights scrutiny 
exercised by the Court. It is not merely the construction of the scope of EU law giving rise 
to the fundamental rights protection that makes this all very forceful. This interpretation 
also made it possible for the CJEU to impose the obligation to respect fundamental rights 
on the Member States enforcing EU law even when the concrete EU measure had not 
specifically provided for the protection of fundamental rights. Thus, any and all EU 
measures were implicitly strengthened with fundamental rights as Member States’ measures 
giving effect to them were now subject to a fundamental rights review. Admittedly, this was 
still the very beginning of EU fundamental rights scrutiny by the CJEU, done on a case by 
case basis and lacking any clear internal fundamental rights policy from the EU, furthermore 
the entire body of Community law was much less at the time. All this had changed by the 
time the Charter came into force some two decades later.
The Court has taken this broad interpretation further to the extent that the given 
measure is still liable to fundamental rights scrutiny even in situations where Member 
States decide to derogate from EU law. The leading case here is the ERT case, where the 
compatibility of the freedom of services and establishment with a Greek law granting 
exclusive rights to a radio and television company was at stake. In the case the Court made 
it clear that regardless of the fact that public policy exceptions from the free movement 
rules were invoked by Greece, this did not insulate the state measure from an appraisal in 
the context of the fundamental rights protection under EU law.14 Also, a Member State’ 
restriction of EU fundamental freedoms was also considered as an instance that triggers the 
full respect of EU protected fundamental rights. This is exemplified by the well-known 
Schmidberger15 and Omega cases,16 where national measures for the protection of 
fundamental rights were accepted as public policy justifications for the limitation of EU 
free movement rights. It was only in the so-called ‘wholly internal situations’ where the 
CJEU refrained from reviewing Member States’ action as they prima facie fell out of the 
scope of EU law.17
This ambiguity regarding the phrase used by the Article 51(1) of the Charter making it 
applicable to Member States ‘only when implementing Union law’ was not reduced by the 
Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights,18 which was published with the 
Charter at the time of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The Explanations draw on the 
Karlsson case19 as the leading authority on the meaning of ‘when implementing Union 
law’. As shown above, this notion is used by the Court in a broad sense, rather as a synonym 
14 C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi (ERT) [1991] ECR I-2925. 
15 C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5649.
16 C-36/02, Omega, [2004] ECR I-9609.
17 C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629.
18 OJ C 303, 14.12.2007, 17-35 in the light of the drafting adjustments made to the text of the 
Charter by that Convention (notably to Articles 51 and 52) and of further developments of Union law. 
Although the Explanations do not as such have the status of law, they are a valuable tool of 
interpretation intended to clarify the provisions of the Charter.
19 C-929/97 Karlsson [200] ECR I-2737. paragraph 37.
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to the notion of acting within the scope of EU law. The Explanations then go on and refer to 
two instances that the drafters possibly had in mind when coining the notion of 
‘implementing Union law’, namely the Wachauf 20 and the ERT21 line of cases, where in 
implementing EU law Member States were obliged to respect EU fundamental rights. The 
European Convention’s Presidium further refined the Explanations and added a reference to 
the Annibaldi case,22 which contained a more elaborate analysis on the sufficient links a 
situation needs to show with EU law to trigger EU fundamental rights protection. 
Thus, while the text of the Charter uses the rather limited language of ‘implementing 
EU law’ in drawing the scope of the field of application of the Charter vis-á-vis the Member 
States, the Explanations did cite the current CJEU case law, thus allowing a much wider 
margin. However in this respect, the Explanations did not improve clarity but rather further 
demonstrated the gap between the Charter’s formulation and the CJEU’s practice on the 
exact scope of the field of application of fundamental rights.
There were important reasons for why the Explanations reiterated and took a broader 
view. The implication of drawing a narrow scope for the Charter, so that it applies to the 
Member States only when implementing EU law, is that there would be situations where 
Member States would be bound by the Charter and situations where, although still acting 
within the ambit of EU law, they would not be so bound. Craig points out that there is 
simply no normative argument for any such distinction in subjecting Member States to 
fundamental rights scrutiny.23 On the contrary, when Member States derogate from EU law 
or limit EU fundamental freedoms, they should be even more susceptible to a fundamental 
rights review of their actions based on EU law. Should any such distinction persist between 
the scrutiny over situations where EU Member States implement EU law and other instances 
where they merely operate under EU law further difficulties would arise. It could have been 
still possible that the CJEU would not recognise any such distinction, or at least would be 
reluctant to overrule its prior case law maintaining its own broader approach. There is 
nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon that would, even in an implied manner, support the above 
distinction of cases.
The CJEU maintained its broad view in defining situations when Member State 
measures falling under the scope of EU law during the numerous years between the 
proclamation and the final acceptance of the binding character of the Charter and despite 
the ongoing debate of the Charter’s scope of application. To be sure a convincing string of 
cases support the view that fundamental rights scrutiny was applied to Member States not 
only when implementing EU law, more specifically transposing EU directives,24 but also 
when operating under the scope of EU law, and generally applying EU measures. In the 
20 E.g. Pernice (2002) or more recently Peers, Hervey, Kenner, Ward (2014)1427–1449. 
21 C-929/97 Karlsson [200] ECR I-2737. paragraph 37.
22 C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493.
23 Craig (2009) 212.
24 C-305/05 Ordre des bureaux francophone et germanophones [2007] ECR 5305 regarding the 
implementation of the Money Loundering Directive where the right to fair trial was raised, the 275/06 
Promusicae [2008] ECR I-271 related to various EU directives on electronic commerce and electronic 
communication and right to property and privacy, 336/07 Kabel Deutschland [2008] ECR I-10889 
where the implementation of the Universal Services Directive triggered the issues of freedom of 
expression, 421/2007 Damgaard [2009] ECR 2629, C-45/08 Spector Photo [2009] ECR I-12073 
concerning the presumption of innocence in the context of the implementation of the EU Insider 
Dealing Directive.
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Österreichische Rundfunk and Lindqvist cases, for example, concerning the interpretation of 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data, the Court found that authorities and 
courts of the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent 
with the Directive, but that they need to ensure that no such interpretation is relied upon 
which would be in conflict as protected in the EU legal order.25 
In the context of derogating from EU law and/or limiting EU fundamental freedoms, 
the Court has maintained the ERT and Schmiedberger line of cases. Prime examples of this 
are the Laval and Viking cases, where giving effect to EU freedom on services and 
establishment clashed with fundamental rights where the exercise of the former resulted in 
the justified limitation of the right to collective action.26 The Dynamic Medien case27 can 
also be cited where right of the child and protection of children was considered as legitimate 
justifications to limit the EU right free movement of goods. 
In fact, the Court even expanded its already broad reading of cases interpreted as 
falling within the scope of EU law. In the Carpenter case,28 the situations falling within in 
the scope of EU law were stretched further by subjecting national immigration measures to 
fundamental rights scrutiny in a situation where the sole link to EU law was that the 
applicant’s deportation would hinder their spouse’s exercise of EU fundamental freedoms 
and be of a detriment of their right to family life. In the Mangold and later in the 
Kücükdeveci cases, the CJEU have taken the obligation to respect EU fundamental rights in 
applying EU law to situations between private parties.29 This move can also be read as 
giving more breadth to fundamental rights scrutiny not only by expanding the interpretation 
of the scope of EU law but also extrapolating it to horizontal situations.
What is clear is that on the eve of the Charter coming into force by being elevated to 
EU primary law, the issue of the exact scope of its application to the Member States was 
unclear. There was the Charter itself, with its use of rather restrictive language. However 
the Explanations, attached to the Charter, referred to the broader CJEU case law, though not 
to all of its aspects. Finally, there was the CJEU which was further expanding the terrain in 
which Member States were considered to be acting under the scope of EU law, thereby 
expanding the scope of national measures which were susceptible to fundamental rights 
review. It was against this rather unclear backdrop that the CJEU had to start applying and 
interpreting the Charter, now as proper EU law. This ambiguity to what degree will the 
Charter exactly penetrate into the Member States’ legislative and administrative actions also 
explains why Member States found it crucial to supplement both the Charter and the Treaty 
on European Union with the disclaimer that the Charter shall not expand the competences 
of the EU. 
25 C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichische Rundfunk [2003] ECR 2003 I-04989 
C-101/01 Lindqvist [2003] ECR 12971.
26 C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779.
27 C- 244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR 505.
28 C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR 6279.
29 C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I’9981 and later the C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR 
I-365.
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3. THE ÅKERBERG FRANSSON CASE, AND ITS AFTERMATH
The CJEU was understandably very cautious in making recourse to the Charter, given its 
non-binding status at the time, after its initial proclamation in December 2000. It was only 
six years later, that the Court turned directly to the Charter in a case where the European 
Parliament sought the annulment of the Family Reunification Directive, arguing that the 
instrument gives ground for Member States to restrict fundamental rights.30 
Once there were no more open questions regarding the legal status of the Charter, the 
Court wasted little time in turning to its provisions to decide cases. The first series of these 
cases dealt with various situations falling under the scope of the Charter and calling for the 
interpretation of the rights contained therein. The Runevič-Vardyn case31 was where the 
broad interpretation of Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin was justified based on Article 21 of the Charter, then 
the Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D case.32 The court invoked the Charter to 
interpret the so-called Qualification Directive in relation to the protection of refugees. The 
concept of EU citizenship was at stake in the McCarthy case,33 which is also re-affirmed by 
Article 45 of the Charter. In the Schecke case,34 the Court found provisions in various EU 
regulations invalid for requiring publication of information on the beneficiaries of 
agricultural aid the on the basis of the Charter.
Yet none of these cases provided an opportunity to precisely ascertain the precise 
scope of application of the Charter. It was the Åkerberg Fransson case35 that finally brought 
the question of the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter and the formulations of 
‘only when implementing EU law’ and ‘scope of EU law’ directly before the Court. 
It is worth considering the facts in detail as the case has a wide reaching impact 
regarding the question of the extent to which Member States’ actions trigger fundamental 
rights protection afforded by the Charter when acting within the realm of EU law.
The reference, originated from a Swedish court, related to the prosecution of Mr 
Fransson, a fisherman, for VAT fraud and other tax offence. Mr Fransson argued that the 
charges should be dropped as the ne bis in idem principle, as reaffirmed in the Charter, was 
applicable for he had already been subject to tax penalties in an administrative procedure. 
Before going to the merits of the case, the Court needed to establish its jurisdiction and 
therefore ascertain whether the case did indeed fall under EU law and was not a wholly 
internal affair. The Swedish government, the European Commission and other four 
intervening governments36 vehemently argued that the case altogether fell outside the scope 
of EU law and the Charter could not, therefore, be invoked. Their position was that no 
implementation of EU law was at stake in the case since both the criminal and administrative 
proceedings arose from the application of national law. The Court, however, took a different 
position. 
30 C-540/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769.
31 C-391/09 Runevič -Vardyn and Wardyn [2011] ECR I-3787.
32 C-57/09 and C-101/09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D [2010] ECR I-10979.
33 C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375.
34 C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Heifert v Land Hessen [2010] 
ECR I-11063.
35 C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. For scholarly writing on the cases see 
Fontanelli (2013) 315-334, Reestman, Besselink (2013) 169–175, Dougan (2015) 1201–1246.
36 The Czech Republic, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands.
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In its decision, the CEJU directly referred to Article 51(1) of the Charter arguing that 
the formulation ‘only when implementing Union law’ confirms the Court’s previous case 
law related to the scope to which actions of the Member States must comply with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law.37 The decision then proceeded to repeat the well-
known tenets stating that the fundamental rights guarantee is afforded ‘in all situations 
governed by European Union law, but not outside such situations’ and thus the Court has no 
competence to review national legislation if that falls outside the remit of EU law.38 Turning 
to the actual formula used by Article 51(1) of the Charter, the Court recalled the 
Explanations, examined above, and with a bold move stated that according these and in line 
with Article 6(2) of the TEU and 52(7) of the Charter, ‘the requirement to respect 
fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member 
States when they act in the scope of Union law’.39 The central dicta is that EU fundamental 
rights are applicable whenever national legislation falls within the scope of EU law and 
there cannot be situations covered by EU law where fundamental rights are not applicable. 
In other words, ‘the applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter’.40
The implications of the Fransson ruling are far reaching in two distinctive ways. 
Firstly, the question of how to interpret Article 51(1) of the Charter was settled. In essence, 
prior case law is maintained and fundamental rights scrutiny is employed over national 
legislation if that comes under the scope of EU law. This is so regardless of whether the 
Member State measure stricto sensu implements, applies or enforces EU law, derogates or 
limits it, or in any way operates within the realm of EU law. But of course the Court makes 
all the disclaimers to the effect that this does not mean that the Charter would extend the 
scope of application of EU law. In fact, the opposite is true, namely that the protection 
afforded by fundamental rights, now also contained in the Charter, is simply triggered by a 
matter coming under the scope of the EU law.41 This leads to the second, and perhaps even 
more important implication of the ruling. According to the Court the factual scenario of the 
Fransson case falls under the scope of EU law, even though neither the application or 
implementation of EU law, nor a limitation or derogation from it, was at stake. The Court 
found a sufficient link to EU law even though the concerned Swedish national legislation 
on tax and VAT fraud was not adopted to specifically transpose Directive 2006/112 on the 
common system of value added tax. For the Court, it was sufficient that ‘its application 
[was] designed to penalise an infringement of that directive and is therefore intended to 
implement the obligation imposed on the Member States by the Treaty to impose effective 
penalties for conduct prejudicial to the financial interests of the European Union’. Thus the 
link between the Fransson case’s factual scenario and EU law was that the Swedish national 
legislation providing both criminal and administrative sanctions for tax fraud in the context 
of which the ne bis in idem principle was invoked as a general framework also served to 
carry out the rather general obligations stemming from EU law, ‘to take all legislative and 
administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on its 
37 C-617/10 Åkerberg Frausson, Paragraph 18.
38 Paragraph 19 citing the well known case Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629, 
paragraph 15; Case C-309/96 Annibaldi [2007] ECR I-7493, paragraph 13.
39 Paragraph 20.
40 Paragraph 21.
41 Craig, de Burca (2015) 416.
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territory and for preventing evasion’.42 The mere fact that the criminal and administrative 
proceedings against Fransson occurred in the same regulatory regime designed to give 
effect to both national and EU tax law, including effective penalties, was sufficient for the 
Court to pull the entire matter under the scope of EU law.
Remarkably, this link was found to be insufficient for the Advocate General in the 
case, who argued that the national legislation merely ‘secure[d] objectives laid down in 
Union law’43 and the measures taken by the state authorities in the concrete case were to 
punish the provision of false information by taxable persons to the tax authorities. This, 
according to the Advocate General, could not entail a responsibility for the EU to protect 
fundamental rights, the ne bis in idem principle specifically, as that would trigger the 
assertion that the general requirement in EU law to effectively collect VAT and prevent tax 
evasion entails the ‘transfer of all the constitutional guarantees governing the exercise of 
the Member States’ power to impose penalties, including the collection of VAT, from the 
Member States to the Union’.44 With this observation, the Advocate General goes to the 
heart of the matter; tax collection is undertaken by the Member States and the EU has no 
competence in this field, or with regards to the sanctioning of tax fraud and evasion. The 
general objective spelled out by the EU of wanting Member States to effectively collect 
VAT and penalize fraud is not sufficient to avail the fundamental rights regime in a case 
which is confined to the application of national tax law. However this approach was not 
followed by the Court. 
Perhaps sensing the gap between handing down the dicta on Article 51(1) in the 
Fransson case and at the same time projecting EU fundamental rights protection to a factual 
scenario not evidently falling under the scope of EU, the Court subsequently used every 
single occasion to give hints to what factors qualify a case to be considered as falling under 
the scope of EU law. Immediately following the Fransson case, the Ymeraga, Siragusa and 
Hernandez cases all provided opportunities for the Court to refine its stance as to what is 
meant by the scope of EU law and when it considers a Member State to operate under EU 
law for the purposes of fundamental rights protection afforded by the Charter. This general 
approach, which sees the Court opening up a novel issue by making a sweeping statement 
and then use subsequent cases to fill the abstractly formulated dicta with substance, is well 
known.45 
In the Ymeraga case46, the Court found the immigration matter falling outside the 
scope of EU law and went on, in detail, to explain the required criteria for a case to fall 
under the scope of EU law. In deciding on this matter, the Court noted that: ‘it must be 
ascertained among other things whether the national legislation at issue is intended to 
implement a provision of European Union law, what the character of that legislation is, and 
42 Paragraph 25 of the judgment citing 2, 250(1) and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 
28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, 1.).
43 Opinion od Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 June 2012 ECLI:EU:C:2012:340 
paragraph 60.
44 Opinion od Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 June 2012 ECLI:EU:C:2012:340 
paragraph 63.
45 Just to name the most well known: 4/73 Nold [1974] ECR 491 identify general principles of 
Community law, including the protection of fundamental rights, 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] 
ECR 263 on implied external competences, C-6 and 9/90 Frankovich and Bonifaci [1991] ECR 5357 
in relation to state liability for violating EU law.
46 C-87/12 Ymeraga and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:291.
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whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by European Union law, even if it is 
capable of indirectly affecting that law, and also whether there are specific rules of European 
Union law on the matter or capable of affecting it’.47
Applying this formula to the facts of the case resulted in that although the 
Luxembourgish law intended to implement EU law, the case itself was not governed by 
European Union law since the applicant had not availed his EU free movement rights and 
always lived in his state on nationality. Moreover the applicant was not considered a 
beneficiary either for the purposes of the Family Reunification Directive or for the 
Citizenship Directive.48 Hence the Court declined to consider the Luxembourg authorities’ 
refusal to grant a right of residence to the applicant’s family members from an EU 
fundamental rights perspective. 
This case fits into the long line of cases related to EU free movement rights where the 
lack of exercising the free movement right results in the case being considered as covering 
a wholly internal situation and thus falling outside the scope of EU law.49 The use of the 
formula certainly distinguishes the Ymeraga case, especially seen as a specific effort to 
clarify and provide guidance for the propositions of the Fransson case. True, some elements 
of the test can be traced back to the Annibaldi ruling, where the lack of implementation of 
EU law; the pursuit of other objectives and the only indirect effect on the EU regulatory 
area led to the conclusion that the national measures fall outside the scope of EU law.50 But 
the test offered in Ymeraga is novel in that it is primarily used to ascertain whether a 
situation involving the implementation of European Union law also comes within the 
meaning of Article 51 of the Charter. 
The exact same test was repeated in the Siragusa case,51 where a property owner 
carrying out alterations without permission was ordered by the Sicilian authorities to restore 
his property in a landscape conservation area to its former state. In its reference, the national 
court asked whether Article 17 of the Charter on the right to property precludes any such 
national measure. The CJEU, in declining its jurisdiction, carefully explained why such a 
case would not fall under EU law and hence would not come under the scope of the Charter. 
Specifically, the Court found that the aim of the national legislation to protect cultural 
heritage and landscape is an aspect of the protection of the environment, admittedly an 
objective shared by EU environmental law. According to the CJEU, more is needed for a 
case to come under the scope of EU law and qualify under Article 51(1) of the Charter as 
implementing EU law. At this point, however, the Court did not turn to the Ymeraga test 
immediately but continued in reasoning that a ‘certain degree of connection above and 
47 C-87/12 Ymeraga and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:291 paragraph 41.
48 Respectively Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification (OJ 2003 L 251, 12) and Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and 
repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 
90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, 77 and corrigenda OJ 2004 L 229, 35, and 
OJ 2005 L 197, 34).
49 175/78 Saunders [1979], 35-36/82 Morson and Jhanjan [1982] ECR 3723. 64-65/96 Uecker 
[1997] ECR 3171.]
50 Case C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493, paragraphs 21–23.
51 C-206/13 Siragusa ECLI:EU:C:2014:126.
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beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect 
impact on the other’ needs to exist. This is where the gap between the dicta of the Fransson 
case and the actual fact scenario of the same case is bridged by the Court. In the Siragusa 
case, the CJEU maintains every detail of its conclusions regarding Article 51(1) in the 
Fransson case, but refines the process for determining whether a specific case actually falls 
under EU law and thus triggers the Charter.
On this basis, the CJEU clarified that there are greater requirements for a case to fall 
under the scope of EU law than that the national measures share the same objective with 
that of the EU, have an indirect impact or generally fall into an area where the EU also has 
powers. One may dare ask whether the Fransson case itself would have passed this hurdle. 
In any case citing the formula from the Ymeraga case52 and meticulously applying it to the 
facts of the Siragusa case led to the finding that EU law does not impose obligations to 
protect the landscape, akin to those laid down by Italian law. The Court found that EU 
legislation pursues different objectives than the national legislation even though EU law 
otherwise recognises the landscape as one of the factors to be taken into consideration in 
assessing the impact of a project on the environment. In addition the Court added that the 
fact that national legislation is capable of indirectly affecting EU law in itself does not 
constitute a sufficient connection between that legislation and EU law and finally the 
national provisions do not implement rules of EU law.
The Court went further, in a sort of obiter dicta and retrospectively explained the 
Fransson ruling. According to the Court, the primary objective of its ruling is to ensure the 
protection of fundamental rights in all areas of EU activity irrespectively of whether that is 
manifested through EU action or Member State implementation. Consequently, there is a 
need to ensure that the level of protection does not vary according to national laws as that 
would eventually undermine EU law.53 With this statement the circle is complete. In the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case54 at the dawn of the EU fundamental rights regime, 
in the early seventies, the same reasoning was employed for inventing the general principles 
of EU law and identifying the protection fundamental rights as being part of that source of 
law. Today, when the written Charter of Fundamental Rights is at stake and its application 
to national measures ‘implementing Union law’ is to be determined, the same reason and 
justification is used but with different consequences.
Whereas at the time of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the mere proposition of 
employing an EU-based fundamental rights scrutiny over both the then Community and 
national implementing measures was revolutionary and was more driven to insulate EC 
measures from fundamental rights scrutiny stemming from national laws. It was for the 
preservation of the autonomy of EC law that a fundamental rights review having its source 
in EC law itself was necessary. Subjecting national measures implementing EC law under 
the same scrutiny was more of a secondary issue. Today, the legal scenario is much more 
complex, EU regulatory areas are vast and so are the subsequent national laws giving effect 
52 See above ‘implementation of EU law for the purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, some of 
the points to be determined are whether that legislation is intended to implement a provision of EU 
law; the nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU 
law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of 
EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it’.
53 Siragusa paragraphs 31 and 32.
54 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3.
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to them. The autonomy of EU law has been already established, EU law based fundamental 
rights scrutiny is accepted as a baseline. The question here is rather the depth of this scrutiny 
touching upon domains reserved for the Member States. Equally subjecting the EU and its 
Member States to the same fundamental rights scrutiny is a well justified objective in 
ensuring that standards of protection remain the same and EU law based fundamental rights 
protection is afforded irrespective of the vehicle – national or EU – giving effect to the 
challenged measure. It can be reasoned that this is required to preserve the internal 
coherence of EU law. However, drawing the line between when Member States implement 
EU law and when they do not has become much more sensitive exercise then simply 
lamenting on the meaning of the formulation ‘only when implementing EU law’ formulation.
All of these arguments most recently resurfaced and were repeated in the Fernandez 
case.55 In this case, the CJEU rejected to subject the Spanish national legislation providing 
the employer a right to compensation from the state in respect of the remuneration paid to 
an employee during proceedings challenging that employee’s dismissal beyond the 60th 
working day after the action challenging the dismissal was brought as falling outside the 
scope of EU law.56 The Court thus refused to review the Member State’s measure under the 
Charter, employing the Fransson, Ymeraga and Siragusa line of cases and demonstrating 
that this is now considered as settled case law.
The Fransson case, complemented by the Ymeraga, Siragusa and Hernandez cases, 
provide an answer to the question of the scope of application of the Charter with respect to 
the Member States. The Fransson case confirmed that, despite the unfortunate language 
used in Article 51(1) of the Charter, the long standing case law of the CJEU stands firm and 
intact in pulling national measures under EU fundamental rights review should they fall 
under the scope of EU law. The Fransson case also confirmed that there are no scenarios 
when Member State operate under EU law but would not have an obligation to respect EU 
fundamental rights. Whereas the Fransson case is the big leap, its general language and 
also its rather weak factual scenario desperately called for further elaboration of the 
proposition it established.57 The Ymeraga case, relying on the tenets of the old Annibaldi 
ruling, provides a test as well, as to how to determine whether the national measures falls 
under the scope of EU law. The Siragusa case can be seen as the case which combined all 
these factors and the Court openly states that the Ymeraga test is needed to establish a 
connection between the said national measures and EU law in order to establish that the 
national measure falls under the scope of EU law. The Court also clearly explains the 
Fransson case’s dicta that fundamental rights protection always follows national measures 
that come under the scope of EU law, now simply labelled as implementing EU law, without 
the qualifications thought to be present in the Charter. Admitting that the whole exercise in 
pulling any and all national measures implementing EU law under fundamental rights 
scrutiny is to ensure that no differences in protection levels occur due to different national 
standards and the unity and effectiveness of EU law is ensured that protection is afforded 
irrespectively whether it is the EU or its Member States that take action. 
55 Case C-198/13 Hernandez ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055.
56 Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on 
the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer (OJ 2008 L 283, 36).
57 There is another aspect of the Fransson case related to Article 53 of the Charter on protection 
levels which read together with the Melloni and cases clarifies how and when Member States can 
uphold protection standards higher then afforded by the Charter. See C-399/11 Melloni [2013] ECR.
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4. THE FRANSSON CASE LAW BEFORE THE HUNGARIAN JUDICIARY 
It is for the national courts, now equipped with the case law mapping out the exact scope of 
the applicability of the Charter in relation to legislation falling under the scope of EU law, 
to identify such instances and invoke the Charter accordingly. National courts are in the 
front line in applying and enforcing EU law. They are therefore the immediate instances 
where parties are able to challenge national laws that implement EU law and seek redress 
for alleged fundamental rights violations. In fact, national courts may not only be the most 
accessible and efficient, but also the only forum to provide remedies for the individuals 
challenging national measures that allegedly breach EU fundamental rights. This is why it 
is crucial for EU law as a whole that national courts fully comprehend the Fransson case 
law and are able to apply what it says about the applicability of the Charter vis-á-vis 
national measures giving effect to EU law. 
The dicta of the Fransson case, the Ymargen case’s test and their synthesis in the 
Siragusa case are all at the disposal of national courts for determining whether a given 
national measure falls under the scope of EU law, that triggering the protection ensured by 
the Charter. Unfortunately to date Hungarian national courts have not availed themselves to 
the guidance provided by the CJEU.
While the Fransson case itself has received little academic attention in Hungary, the 
whole issue of the scope of EU law and Article 51 of the Charter has recently been subject 
to intense litigation, with applicants invoking the applicability of the Charter.58 The first 
court case where this issue surfaced was a Constitutional Court order, where the court 
rightly concluded that the underlying factual scenario, relating to land use, fell outside the 
scope of the Charter as it did not involve the implementation of EU law from the part of the 
Member States.59 Similarly, in a case which concerned the sale of immovable property, the 
Miskolc court found that the underlying facts had no EU law aspect and was governed 
solely by national law, and hence did not fall under the scope of application of the Charter.60 
A distinct group of cases where the Charter was cited by the applicants relates to the 
dismissal of civil servants, allegedly violating the Charter, after the Act on the status of civil 
servants was amended in 2010. In all these cases, the labour courts rightly considered the 
Charter and found it not to apply to the cases as amended Act did not fall under the scope of 
EU law.61
A more interesting group of cases that specifically dealt with Article 51 of the Charter 
and the scope of Charter applicability revolve around Act no XXXVIII of 201462 on 
consumer credit. The Act renders all consumer credit contracts retroactively unfair as the 
58 Case available at the Bírósági Határozatok Gyűjteménye at <http://birosag.hu/ugyfelkapcsolati-
portal/anonim-hatarozatok-tara> were analysed for the purposes of this paper. Accessed 7 February 
2016.
59 3140/2013 of 02/07/2013. The very first judgment mentioning the Charta since it was invoked 
by the plaintiff being Pf.V.20.345/2010/20.
60 13.G.40.123/2013/14. See also Pf.I.20.131/2014/5., 17.P.20.050/2013/47, 25.P.21.867/2011/15, 
25.P. 22.432/2008/61 Gf.II.30.106/2015/7., Pf.II.20.712/2013/9., Gf. III. 30.135/2014/5. 
61 2.Mf.20.981/2014/4., Mf.634735/2012/4, Mf.637399/2012/5, Mf.634070/2012/549. But see 
to the contrary Mf.638866/2012/3 where the court found that the dismissal was unlawful and also 
violated the Charter, although the underlying facts did not come under the scope of EU law.
62 In itself a curious piece of legislation bearing the title of Act no XXXVIII of 2014 on settling 
certain issues arising from the authoritative judgment of the Kúria on consumer credit contracts of 
financial institutions (Act on consumer credit).
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general terms and conditions of these contracts allowed for the possibility of a unilateral 
modification of the contract with respect to interest rates, fees or charges. The Act triggered 
a series of litigation as foreign currency based consumer contracts, which by definition 
allowed for the raising of credit fees to follow exchange rates fluctuation, were now 
considered unfair with reference to Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.63 
Applicants challenged the underlying legislation on numerous grounds, among others as 
violating the Articles 47 (right to fair trial), 16 (freedom to conduct business) and 17 (right 
to property) of the Charter, which were claimed to be applicable to these cases through 
Article 51. Along the same lines, the applicants questioned the compatibility of the Act on 
consumer credit with EU law, including the Charter, and sought a request for a preliminary 
ruling. 
The Metropolitan Court and the Supreme Court (Kúria), in their respective decisions 
but using similar lines of argument, denied the applicability of the Charter. One judgment, 
for example, considered invoking the Charter in the context deciding whether there is a 
need to refer the matter before the CJEU solely.64 It arrived at the striking conclusion that 
since the applicants had not sought for the interpretation of EU law (but challenged the 
compatibility of domestic law with rights protected under the Charter and principles of EU 
law), there was by definition no room for the court to make a preliminary reference. Besides 
this complete misunderstanding of the material scope of the preliminary reference, the court 
did not even consider the application of the Charter to the substantive part of the case i.e. by 
considering domestic law as implementing EU law under the auspices of the EU Charter. 
Some of the judgments in this line of cases did not consider the Charter at all even though it 
was raised by the applicants. One judgment stated that the underlying issues do not concern 
EU law and hence completely disregarded not only the Charter but Directive 93/13.65 In 
another judgment, the court stated that the Charter was not applicable since the underlying 
Act was not meant to implement EU law. Amusingly, the court went on to add since the 
State was the respondent in the civil suit case and not exercising its public power that 
Directive 93/13.66 Another judgment,67 based on the same factual scenario, at least 
considered the applicability of the Charter to the merits of the case but found that it was not 
applicable since the Act on consumer credit is not an implementation measure as it was not 
intended to transpose Directive 93/13. It added that even if this was not so, the interpretation 
of the Charter would still not be relevant as it was not related to the issue of determining 
whether the contractual provision was unfair.
63 OJ L 095 21/04/1993.
64 32.G.43.296/2014/13., 32.G.43.297/2014/18., 25.G.43.377/2014/8., 30.G.43.498/2014/6, 
30.G.44.142/2014/5, 8.G.43.411/2014/17, 32.G.40.113/2015/9. and 4.G.40.147/2015/7. Reaching the 
same conclusion through a very brief reasoning 36.G.43.409/2014/6.
65 14.G.43589/2014/8., where the applicant did raise the Charter but the Court found that the 
issues do not concern EU law but national law only, hence did not even consider the Charter. See also 
57.G. 43.425/2014/8., 4.G.44559/2014/4., G.40240/2015/7. 
66 1.G.43.295/2014/8.
67 5.G.43.386/2014/7. See also 25.G.43.288/2014/9., 25.G.43.377/2014/8., 5.G.43.469/2014/6., 
19.G. 43.382/2014/9., 35.G.43.833/2014/10., 36.G.43.409/2014/6., 19.G.43.383/2014/9., 3.G.43.467/ 
2014/8., 5.G.43.587/2014/6.
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One of the more thoroughly reasoned judgment68 repeats the arguments found in the 
above decisions in a much more comprehensible manner. Whereas the previous court 
decisions simply stated that the Act on consumer credit was not an implementing measure, 
here the reasoning goes further and says that the Act merely synthetizes the existing 
jurisprudence related to the grounds upon which unfairness of a consumer contract may be 
established. As the Act on consumer credit did not create new grounds of unfairness that 
could result in nullity, it cannot be regarded as intervening into the contractual relationship 
of the parties. The reasoning concluded that should the Charter be found applicable no 
question of interpretation arises, since the unfair terms would in any case not be reviewed 
under the Charter. This judgment gets the closest to considering the key underlying issue 
regarding the determination of the scope of application of EU law in relation to Article 51’s 
notion of ‘when [Member States are] implementing EU law’. 
Directive 93/13 only vaguely defines what is meant by an unfair term in a consumer 
contract, providing an indicative and non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be 
regarded as unfair in its Annex. It therefore leaves the issue of enumerating unfair terms 
more specifically for the Member States, which in practice means for national courts. Hence 
EU law, while securing minimum harmonisation of the unfair terms of consumer contracts 
(definition of consumer contract and consequences of an unfair term), leaves a wide margin 
for the Member States to define the notion of what is considered unfair. The issue, of course, 
is whether Member States, in operating facilitating this wide margin, remain in the domain 
of their national law or have come under the auspices of EU law, the latter of which would 
trigger the applicability of the Charter.
In light of the Fransson case law,69 to which some of the above judgments actually 
refer,70 the mere fact that the Act on consumer credit was not adopted to transpose a 
Directive does not insulate it from the scope of application of EU law triggering the Charter. 
The Act on consumer credit was especially designed to consolidate the issue of unfair terms 
of consumer credit contracts, thus in effect it facilitated the application of Directive 93/13 
in this specific field. It should therefore be regarded as constituting the implementation of 
Directive and as such would fall under the scope of EU law for the purposes of Article 51 
of the Charter.71 
The above judgments show a very narrow reading of Article 51 of the Charter by 
Hungarian courts, limiting its applicability to only those situations where EU law is 
specifically transposed by a given national measure. This interpretation materially deprives 
private persons of the protection afforded by the Charter in situations when Member States 
apply EU law, give effect to EU law through national legislation, provide remedy or when 
simply ensure a procedure for the application of EU law. Everything that the Fransson, the 
Ymeraga and the Sirgausa cases have established regarding Charter applicability is ignored, 
giving way to a very restricted reading of the Charter. The consequence of this is to insulate 
68 19.G.40.282/2015/7. See also 35.G.40.319/2015/8. examplifying an elaborate discussion of 
the applicability of the Charter.
69 C-617/10 ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
70 25.G.43.288/2014/9.; 25.G.40.109/2015/5.; 25.G.43.377/2014/8. 
71 See paragraphs 27-28 of the judgment.
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national measures giving effect to EU law from EU fundamental rights scrutiny.72 Should 
this practice be maintained, restricting the effect of the Charter in the Hungarian domestic 
context by systematically failing to apply the Charter to national measures coming under 
the scope of EU law may also add up as a breach of treaty obligations and incur state 
liability under EU law.73
5. CONCLUSION 
After a decade of limbo, the EU Charter of the Fundamental Rights is now the full-fledged 
EU primary law instrument for the protection of fundamental rights. As it was shown above 
one of the pivotal questions relating to the scope of the Charter was how to delimit its 
applicability. In particular, the key issue was whether to confine its applicability to cases 
involving EU institutions and making it only marginally applicable in the context of national 
laws that also serve as vehicles of EU law or to allow the Charter to govern a broad range 
of situations where national laws intersect with areas governed EU law.
It was demonstrated that the drafters of the Charter were very much aware of this 
question and perfectly comprehended that should the Charter be afforded with greater 
breadth, this would in effect entail scrutinizing a much wider range of Member States’ 
measures, touching upon domains thought to be left to national competence. The gravity of 
this issue led to a compromise that the relevant Charter article uses a restrictive language, 
confining the applicability of the instrument in relation to the Member States ‘only when 
implementing Union law’. However, by the time the issue of how broad a scope to give the 
Charter surfaced, the CJEU has already developed its own interpretation of what situations 
trigger EU fundamental rights scrutiny. This case law is noted by the Explanations attached 
to the Charter, which serves as a guide in interpreting and applying the Charter in the 
context of national measures.
Once the Charter came into full effect, it was for the Court to bring clarity to the issue 
of applicability and it was just a matter of time for the relevant case law to develop. It was 
the Åkerberg Fransson case when the Court specifically addressed how to interpret the 
formulation of ‘only when implementing Union law’ and found that the Charter is indeed 
applicable whenever national legislation falls within the scope of EU law. The Court thus 
projected its pre-Charter case law on defining the scope of EU human rights review vis-á-
vis national measures and reinforced that the scope of the Charter shall be read accordingly. 
This meant that whenever national law operates under the scope of EU law, EU fundamental 
rights scrutiny would follow. One of the main repercussions of the Fransson case is that 
there would be no such scenarios where a Member States operated under EU law without 
72 There is another aspect of the Fransson case which goes beyond the scope of this paper is 
related to paragraph (3) Article 52 of the Charter pitching the standard of protection provided by the 
Charter to that of guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. The considerations made 
by the CJEU in this regard were rightly followed in two subsequent Hungarian court judgments. See 
Kfv.III.37.666/2012/27. and Kfv.III.37.690/2013/29. This latter judgment is particualry interesting as 
recourse to the Charter being the vehicle of the ECHR allowed the national court to enforce higher 
standrads of protection in competition law cases despite a contrary provision of the Code on Civil 
Procedure.
73 C-224/01 Köbler [2003] I-10239.
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the obligation to respect EU fundamental rights. Subsequent cases gave guidance in 
deciding whether a given case falls under the scope of EU law for the purposes of 
fundamental rights review. In the Ymeraga case, the Court added that for a national measure 
to come under the scope of EU law it must be ascertained whether the measure has intended 
to implement EU law; what objectives the measure pursues; what is the character of the 
national legislation and whether there is specific EU legislation on the matter. For a national 
measure to come under the scope of EU law, more is required than sharing the same 
objective with that of the EU, having an indirect impact or generally falling into an area 
where the EU also has powers. In the Siragusa case, the CJEU further noted that in general 
a certain degree of connection is needed between a national measure and EU law beyond 
that the matters covered are simply closely related or have an indirect impact.
In light of the key role of national courts in giving effect to EU law, and thereby also 
to the Charter, it is primarily for the national courts to correctly identify when national 
measures operate under the scope of EU law and thus trigger the application of the Charter. 
The interpretation afforded by the CJEU in the Fransson, Ymeraga and Siragusa cases 
provide clear guidance as to the factors to consider in deciding whether the underlying case 
falls under the scope of EU law. They also send a very strong message to the effect that in 
principle Member States are bound to respect EU fundamental rights whenever they operate 
on the terrain of EU law. 
In view of this heightened responsibility of national courts in making the Charter truly 
effective an overview of how Hungarian national courts have used the guidance in the 
Fransson, Ymeraga and Siragusa cases was presented. The analyses of the cases where 
courts considered the applicability of the Charter shows a very narrow reading of its scope. 
The examined judgments all revert to a very limited reading of the Charter, irrespective of 
the CJEU’s interpretation, and confine the Charter’s applicability to situations when a 
Member State specifically transposes EU law. This restricted interpretation materially 
deprives private persons from benefiting from EU fundamental rights protection in all other 
situations where the said national measure does not specifically transpose an EU measure, 
but comes under the scope of EU law in some other way. The consequence of this narrow 
reading of the Charter is to insulate a significant volume of national measures that give 
effect to EU law from EU fundamental rights scrutiny. This is the direct opposite outcome 
from the interpretation the CJEU afforded to the applicability of the Charter as mapped out 
in the Fransson, Ymeraga and Siragusa cases.
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